Abstract-The expansion and democratization of the digital world coupled with the effect of the Internet globalization, has allowed individuals, countries, states and companies to interconnect and interact at incidence levels never previously imagined. Cybercrime, in turn, is unfortunately one the negative aspects of this rapid global interconnection expansion. We often find malicious individuals and/or groups aiming to undermine the integrity of Information Systems for either financial gain or to serve a cause. Our study investigates and proposes a hybrid data mining methodology in order to detect abnormal behavior that could potentially threaten the security of an Information System, in a simple way that is understandable to all involved parties, whether they are security experts or standard users.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, it is very easy to communicate, exchange ideas, acquire content and develop knowledge by using the Internet. The operational maintenance of Information Systems is therefore an essential criterion for any business, government and/or individual seeking to use this medium to deliver content, offer services, or simply wishing to communicate with others. Unfortunately, an often experienced negative aspect of this Information System's global expansion is a phenomenon called Cybercrime. Malicious individuals and/or groups aim to attack and harm individuals, companies and/or even government branches for monetary reward and/or in pursuit of a cause. The objective of this paper is to first analyze and explain the current state of intrusion detection practices, and secondly, to discuss the work that we carried out to facilitate Information System data flow visualization and first level intrusion/attack detection (scanning, brute forcing). The main contribution of this paper is the use and analysis of firewall logs with data mining methods to detect misuses and abuse. It is important to note that we do not use any network packet inspection tools nor attack classification made by an IDS. This paper is organized as follows. In section II, we present the overview of some related researches in the area of intrusion detection systems. Our motivations for choosing this approach are detailed in section III. The data sets and the results used and obtained from our experimentation are presented in section IV. Finally, our conclusions and the scope of potential future work is presented in section V.
II. RELATED WORKS A. Intrusion detection systems
There are a variety of available tools (IDS, IPS, HIDS, Firewalls 1 ) that allow for scanning and ensuring the relative 1 A firewall is a network security system that controls the incoming and outgoing network traffic based on an applied rule set. security of an entire system. However, these tools themselves can be vulnerable, as they often misinterpret real-time observations, fail to report abnormal behavior, and can become quickly outdated, which can potentially result in a threat or attack to the individual system components mentioned above [1] [2]. It is therefore appropriate and desirable to be able to respond in a timely manner from the instant an intrusion is detected, to deploy adequate countermeasures to respond swiftly to a potential cyber attack. The scope of current Intrusion Detection System solutions can be classified into three groups.
• NIDSs (Network Intrusion Detection Systems) can monitor data collected from their own network segment and signal abnormal transactions/behaviors [3] .
• HIDSs (Host-Based Intrusion Detection Systems) are designed to monitor and detect irregularities in individual hosts. They monitor both inbound and outbound network activity, and moreover are capable of checking the system, software, and any relevant peripheral devices (such as USB storage).
• Hybrid IDSs, combine the different characteristics of NIDS and HIDS, allowing for the possibility to check both network and application layers.
An IDS' mission is to detect intrusion attempts as soon as they happen. Existing solutions are typically based on two concepts (attack signatures and known profiles/ behavioral model) that are generally implemented by almost all IDSs. To keep the system current and to minimize false positives, it is possible to add new signatures/attributes or manually add new behaviors. Table I summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of intrusion detection solutions. The main limitation of existing solutions reside in the fact that they do not take into account the almost continuous evolution of an Information System components.
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B. Data mining-based IDSs
Since the initial studies by Denning [4] , detection systems have continued to evolve. Data mining offers various solutions for the detection and analysis of computer attacks [5] . Lee and Stolfo use data mining methods [6] , which do not require an expert intervention. These methods tend to generate a lot of association rules and therefore exponentially increase the system's level of complexity. This work is based on network capture tool tcpdump and Unix audit data. To use this method, it is mandatory to install a sensor network with a large memory storage space and it is only for Unix system (other OSs are not supported). Using a hybrid (combination different data mining methods) approach is very interesting because it takes care of alert management [7] [8]. Nguyen et al. [9] use an ensemble system of classifiers called CBE based on the K-means algorithm, but the class number must be fixed in advance [10] . This may take time depending on the number of servers to be monitored. Ajiboye et al. propose to use the densitybased DSBCAN algorithm [11] . In fact, even DBSCAN [12] or OPTICS algorithm [13] are capable of determining the number of clusters. However, it is imperative that we define two hard-to-estimate input parameters, such as the radius of the cluster and the minimum required points inside the cluster for DBSCAN, as well as fix the minipoints argument for OPTICS. Moreover with such a large dataset, these algorithms require large memory and computing resources. Using the PCA model with K nearest neighborhood for intrusion detection (on a KDD 99 dataset) [14] or Hierarchical Agglomerative Clustering (HAC) [15] has the advantage of providing good graphic visualization to assist with finding the relevant numbers of cluster. The studies and works presented in the current section are all based on data flow from KDD99 based models [16] . We feel there is a disadvantages of using this process. It is necessary to capture network traffic and this can affect memory storage and time analysis.
III. MOTIVATIONS AND PROPOSAL

A. General principle
We believe security systems should be simple enough and automated as much as possible, so that they are undertsood and deployed when needed by all users of a specific system. It is critical for Information System supervision tools to allow for behavior-based decision support methods (behavior of users, services, servers, etc.), so that accurate event data streams and attack analysis can happen in real time. Considering these ideas should result in the ability to predict risks and threats, not only from known and monitored assets (servers), but also from the evolution of the Information System. Our approach is constituted of four phases.
• Phase 1: Monitoring and visualization of network data. Graphic representation of computer network activities via a data model. • Phase 2: Behavior analysis and alert based on data mining methods.
• Phase 3: Risk scoring and evaluation.
• Phase 4: Action plan building. Phases 1 and 2 could be merged. The vizualtion phase is finally useful when an alert is received or to make a diagnostic. This model is very similar to the Defense Life-cycle [18] and to the intrusion response systems of Kanoun et al. [17] . We add a graphic part and we do not have any attack classifications made by an IDS. Hence, we opt for a monitoring/visualization phase, which is a conventional approach and then an assessment of the risk is determined by a behavior analysis. At the end, an action plan will help to stop or present an abnormal action. Before introducing the concepts of intrusion detection or behavior analysis, let us explain usual procedures. Typically, a network intrusion is based on the following five steps. 1) Reconnaissance: use different sources from the internet to gather potential target information (address IP, site and DNS name owner, email address, social network). 2) Scanning the port: find and record ports, services, operating system and versions used.
3) Gaining access: analyze vulnerabilities for potential exploitation. 4) Maintaining access: keep the system or network permanently engaged. 5) Covering tracks: delete and remove traces from the network and/or system. The first step is extremely difficult to detect because it is dependent on the digital footprint of a business and its staff. Thus, our work focuses on steps 2 and 3, which correspond to the phases 1-3 of the cyber kill chain 3.0 model [19] . All computer attacks usually start by gathering intelligence.
Step 2's ultimate goal is to receive a scanning service offer from a server. A successful information request provides a list of available services (HTTP, HTTPS, FTP, mail, etc.), the version of the services used (Microsoft Internet Information Services or Apache for a Linux server), and the base of the operating system. Scanning activities represent more than 80% of detected cyber attacks [20] . Once this information is known, it is not difficult to find and/or create malicious tools/scripts to exploit known a vulnerability / vulnerabilities in the target server. Hence, it is essential to detect quickly whenever this kind of scanning and enumerating phase is taking place. The methods for information gathering have also evolved. It is now possible to use multiple IP addresses 2 , or use stretched intelligence to limit the arrival of access requests to different ports on a server. The attacker's goal is to receive the required information while minimizing traces of any exchanges. These are used to identify the information needed for preparing potential attacks and for detecting technical anomalies and vulnerabilities. Although this paper focuses on Phase 2, we still provide a summary of Phase 1. This phase is used to provide full data visualization to relevant users (security ingeneer, network analyst, chief information security officer). It is a crucial phase in terms of decision-making for security readiness. Additionally, it is the preamble to the data mining process that is conducted in phase 2. We choose to use a firewall to capture data source. Due to its placement, a firewall can potentially offer full and complete data flow visibility. It can also open the opportunity to trace and keep information to highlight these flows of events that have been either authorized and/or prohibited. Moreover, the firewall is the most commonly used security component. The business equipment rate indeed 95% in 2010 [21] . Preprocessing is made from logs connection filtering equipment (log option) and logs are sent to the Syslog-ng server 3 . Through its Perl compatible regular expression (PCRE) pattern matching and filtering options, all flows are saved in the database. Thereafter, computation is carried out via a Perl script. Finally, the Graphviz Suite 4 and Afterglow 5 script components are used to create graphs. The terms of the variables listed below are exported to data containers.
• The source IP address form where the packet originated;
• the destination IP address where the packet was sent to;
• the destination port use on the destiantion address ;
• protocols (UDP and TCP) use on the destination IP address and destination port; • date and time period the the firewall enforces a rule;
• firewall policy rule number matching;
• firewall actions (accept or reject) is done when traffic matches a policy rule. Choosing these variables, we offer the possibility to integrate several types of firewall of different brands. Furthermore, a network probe implementation is no longer necessary.
B. Phase 2: Behavior analysis and alert
Phase 2 is intended to allow for data analysis and the detection of abnormal behavior (if any, which in turn will trigger an alert if needed). We feel it is relevant to use firewall event data mining methods for anomaly detection. Besides, our work uses session data from firewall logs (section IV). Our main goal is to predict risks and threats with respect to network transactions. After consideration of the data studied in Phase 1, we have to perform preprocessing to reduce the available data range. This is required because, for example, the destination port variable includes 65535 possibilities. We opt for grouping variables in the three following categories:
• well-known ports (under 1024) accept and deny;
• port 1024 through 65535 accept and deny;
• administration port (portadm), port activity for server or database administration acceptance and denial. Preprocessing aggregates IP source addresses and combines the occurrences according to the categories mentioned above. Furthermore, it is relevant to consider the total number of transactions carried out by the same source IP address and the number of flows rejected (action denied) and allowed (action permitted) by the firewall. This can be achieved from the data already collected, which are available in different data containers. Once preprocessing was complete, we sought the advice of experts (five in total) to determine whether the observed behavior could definitely be defined as a potential risk or threat. From labeled training data set, we want to predict intrusion from the aggregates of IP source addresses. Supervised learning give us the possibility to construct an estimator that is able to predict the risk. Expert analysis gives us a picture of the security policy. Thus, we integrate this dataset training into a framework that we call D113 [22] . Throughout the supervised leaning process and when using the aggregated data obtained through preprocessing, we focus only on the IP source classification problem. This method does however allow for a few potential risks when compared to a security policies defined by experts (which are not necessarily exhaustive). For example, some servers could add or suppress event data as the Information System evolves. In our view, it is prudent to analyze the suffered behavior by the different servers in order to confirm the supervised learning result. By using two different learning methods [23] , it should be possible to have a quick overview of the IP source and the inherent misuse risks and servers deviation behavior. Finaly, we want to group behaviors into different groups of activities. This method opens up the opportunity to detect abnormal and misuse activity events. On the other hand, we look for abnormal activity on the destination address (server). With this kind of process, it is possible to detect and monitor any behavior on the server. Our first step is to create a data frame and extract every data flow received on each server. The next step is to identify and show that behavior is different. There are a large number of methods to execute unsupervised learning. We want to group IP source behavior according the destination server IP. This cluster analysis revolves around the concept of placing a set of objects in the same group or cluster. By following this methodology, it is possible to identify and verify any behavior deviation. Again, there are various algorithms for achieving this. The main problem with clustering methods is to determine the number of clusters (classes) to be used. Both these solutions have the advantage of providing good graphic visualization to assist with finding the relevant numbers of clusters. Thus, to find the best method for determining the correct cluster number, we use internal validation. We have tested different algorithms and after analyzing the results, we opted for using the Partitioning Around Medoids (PAM) [24] , as is provides the best set of results. But the relevant number of clusters have to be fixed a priori as with other methodologies. To solve this problem, using the PAMK (Partitioning around medoids with estimation of number of cluster) method automatically gives the correct class number by estimating the optimum average.
IV. VALIDATION / PROOF OF CONCEPT
A. Use case
We work on the architecture from a health industry public company with 92,000 employees. Our analysis focuses on three interconnected networks within an extended network (WAN: Wide Area Network) geographically remote and protected by filtering equipment. The objective is to be able to monitor firewall-related events and export them to a data container. To simplify references to different networks, the following nomenclature is used:
• production site: SP1;
• qualification site: SQ1;
• office and remote administration site: SAB1;
These three sites are currently operational, and the information processed and analyzed in the following sections corresponds to real-time data production. IP addresses have been anonymized for privacy reasons. Network SP1 has its own pasteboard outcome of events sent in real-time by the firewall. Network SP1 provides services to 14 million people. Data used are financially sensitive, and need 9.2 terabytes for storage related to transactions amounting to several million Euros a day. Data are heterogeneous and received from several different sources. Table II summarizes the volume in number of lines processed by the filtering equipment. In order to strengthen the integrity of this work, we asked several users from several companies who work as Information Systems security managers to review and criticize our implementation.
B. Phase 2 use case results
Execution of Phase 1 provides us with the opportunity to review network activity. This, in turn, allows for easier understanding when compared to reviewing raw data and events ( Figure 1 ). It is important to note that our study focuses only on session type information (source IP address, destination IP address, protocols and services). After preprocessing, we integrate the new data and opt for supervised learning. We can detect malicious activity as shown in line 3 of Table III , so the 0.7% permit flow could be defined as a marker/trigger for an intrusion. This should be sufficient information to attempt a server access attack. We have tested different kinds of methods for information gathering, such as classic scan (one shot scan), decoy scan (add multiple source of the scan), zombi (use a compromise victim to send the scan), distributed scan (use different machines for the same scan) with different delays (increase the delay when scanning ports; in fact, we saw that a long interval port scanning can hardly find or detect events). In order to have the best detection accuracy, we also tested different supervised learning algorithms by using cross validation (we used a 10-fold cross-validation). The best results are achieved when using the Random Forest algorithm (Table IV) . For the second step of phase 2, we must find the best method for determining the correct cluster number. We have tested different algorithms and after analyzing the results. We compared the PAMK methodology output versus a priori methods (Figure 2) , and we noticed that the results were positive for all servers involved in our study. For instance, the computation time for 53 servers is approximately 0.353 seconds. We build a training data set and save the class attribution result for reference. This means that each server has a specific class number, and that any derivation can be potentially considered as abnormal behavior. Then, we create a test data set for different kinds of scans and we launch several brute force and path traversal attacks (Phase 2 obtain access) 6 . By doing this, we see that the number of classes is directly detected in the target servers. For instance, the main server shifts from 6 to 2 classes. This source of behavior deviation is automatically identified as abnormal activity. Then, we extract data in order to trigger an alert. However, it is possible for an attacker to send massive amounts of data as decoys to try and hide a discreet attack. So, we make a new computations until a similar class number is obtained. Therefore, we can use a variation coefficient (CV) to generate a score [25] . For the moment, we do not control the score, but the variation coefficient provides a general overview that is good enough for the training dataset when compared to the test dataset. We believe that with this kind of process, it will be possible to detect and identify destination servers that have undergone changes in behavior. Once we know this, we can then have a specific overview based on server class variation with CV. This allows to focus on the most critical activity. Our approach allows us to detect large scan, brute force attacks and path tranversal attacks, without any help from experts.
C. Experts feedback
From the point of view of experts (2 senior security ingeneer, 1 security consultant, 1 chief information security officer, 1 senior network analyst), the D113 tool grants the possibility to obtain access to all the rejected flows, including port scanning and brute force attacks. In addition, this tool is very useful to make diagnoses based on verification of security filtering rules. It is possible to report and alert abnormal access to the intrusion detection team. In fact, the different IDS cannot identify these actions. With the data mining learning methods, experts can to visualize the different behaviors on servers. However, the provisional alert thresholds do not appear to correspond to all firewall according to their volume flow. The establishment of an effetive variation coefficient is expected to change this.
V. CONCLUSION AND PERSPECTIVES
The work done on Phase 2 allows us to check internal security by using Random Forest supervised method with an expert's help. The PAMK unsupervised method allows us to detect different kinds of information gathering, potential attacks, and other access methods. By using the variation coefficient (CV) it is possible to score the behavior change levels. In order to make Phase 4 operational, we work on a simple method for interpreting scoring and triggering alerts. Additionally, the work completed in Phase 1 has to be improved to result in a specific and accurate overview of abnormal behavior and misuse. We suggest that other supervised methods, like bagging or boosting, are tested in order to improve accuracy. These phases will generate association rules based on the assets covered by the several attack vectors. Considering of techniques from supervised and unsupervised learning allows for a better support of the attacks within the automatic definition of reported thresholds. We believe this can create a scalable and adaptive real-time system for identifying changes in behavior due to intrusions and attacks.
